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RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES, CIVIL PENALTIES,
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
ALLOWED UNDER THE
KANSAS CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
In Equitable Life Leasing Corp. v. Abbick, 243
Kan. 513, 757 P.2d 304 (1988), the Supreme Court
of Kansas held that a dentist who had obtained a
computer system through a lease/purchase
agreement was entitled to damages for violations of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act
("the Act"), Kan. Stat. Ann., §§ 50-601 to 50-644
(1988), and for breach of contract and common
law fraud when the seller refused to accept a
return of the defective system.
Background
In a third party action, Marion C. Abbick
("Abbick"), a practicing dentist, brought suit
against Moore Business Systems ("Moore"), alleging that the computer system he bought from
Moore had not lived up to Moore's representations. When Moore first contacted Abbick in
1982, it claimed that it was experienced in the
management of dental practices, and that it
could recommend a computer system to Abbick
which could increase Abbick's productivity and
profits, as well as produce accurate and timely
financial records. When Abbick expressed his
skepticism, Moore represented that the system
could be returned if it did not work out.
Abbick relied on Moore's representations,
and made a down payment of $1,185 on a computer system. Abbick financed the transaction
through a lease/purchase agreement with Equitable Life Leasing Corporation ("Equitable") as
buyer/lessor. Several problems eventually arose
with the system, resulting in substantial disruption of Abbick's dental practice, loss of hundreds
of hours, and confusion of financial records.
Moore refused the return of the system, and
Abbick ceased making payments. Equitable then
sued Abbick based on the lease/purchase agreement, and Abbick brought a third party claim
against Moore. Equitable's claim against Abbick
was settled, leaving Abbick's suit against Moore
for the trial court's consideration.

The jury found that Moore had breached the
contract by refusing to take back the computer
system and awarded Abbick $1,185 in actual
damages. The trial judge upheld the verdict, but
imposed a civil penalty of $2,000 against Moore
in lieu of the actual damages award pursuant to §
50-634(b) of the Act. The trial court also awarded
Abbick attorneys' fees pursuant to § 50-634(e) of
the Act. Finally, the trial court upheld the jury's
award of $15,000 in punitive damages against
Moore.
Kansas Supreme Court: Election of Remedies
Not Required
Moore's initial argument on appeal to the
Kansas Supreme Court was that Abbick's claims
under the Act and his claim for common law
fraud were inconsistent. Therefore, the trial
court had erred in refusing to require Abbick to
elect his remedy. The supreme court rejected
this reasoning stating that an election of remedies is required only when claims are inconsistent, such as when one claim alleges what another denies, or when the allegations are mutually repugnant.
Abbick's statutory claim was made under §
50-627(b)(6) of the Act, which provides that it is
unconscionable for a supplier to make a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer is likely to rely to his or her detriment. The
court held that Abbick's statutory claim was not
inconsistent with his common law fraud claim
because the common law fraud claim was based
on a misrepresentation of fact. Further, the court
observed that a 1985 amendment to the Act
clearly provides that a plaintiff who brings a
claim under the Act does not forfeit any common law rights.
The court similarly rejected Moore's contention that Abbick's claims for breach of contract
and fraud were inconsistent. Moore claimed
that Abbick was bound by the terms of the contract because he had failed to seek a rescission of
the contract and therefore had elected to affirm
the contract. By electing to affirm the contract,
Abbick was bound by the terms of the contract
and could not prove reliance on a misrepresentation, which is an essential element of fraud.
The court dismissed this argument, reasoning
that Abbick had attempted to return the system
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thereby seeking a rescission of the contract, but
that Moore had refused to accept it.
Trial Court Had Properly Awarded Punitive
Damages and Attorneys' Fees
The court next discussed Moore's contention
that the trial court erred in awarding punitive
damages for fraud because the jury had made no
finding of actual damages for fraud. The court
affirmed the punitive damage award, noting that
the consideration of a punitive damages claim
under the Act was one of first impression. In its
discussion, the court first stated the applicable
rule of law: a breach of contract claim standing
alone does not call for punitive damages, but
punitive damages are allowed if an independent
tort, such as fraud, is proven. A corollary to this
rule isthat punitive damages may not be awarded
in the absence of actual damages, on the basis
that the law does not punish conduct, however
willful and wanton, which does not cause injury.
The jury found that Moore had breached its
promise under the contract that it would take
back the system if Abbick could not use it, and
the jury in fact awarded Abbick actual damages
of $1,185. The court held that because the
breach of contract was grounded upon fraudulent inducement, and actual damages were
awarded, punitive damages also were proper.
Next, the court summarily rejected Moore's
argument that the trial court's award of a $2,000
civil penalty in addition to the jury's award of
punitive damages constituted a double penalty
against Moore in violation of due process.
Moore cited cases in which the courts had held
that the legislature intended treble damage
awards to be punitive, therefore treble damage
awards could not be supplemented by an additional punitive damages award. Section 50-801(b)
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated provides for
treble damages for certain acts prohibited in
Chapter 50. Moore contended that because the
Kansas Consumer Protection Act is found in
Chapter 50, treble damages could be awarded
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for violations of the Act. Moore argued that
because treble damages might be awarded,
additional punitive damages were not proper.
The court held, however, that § 50-801 covered
acts relating to the restraint of trade, but did not
cover the practices prohibited by the Act.
The court observed that although the Act
does not provide for treble damages, it does
provide for a recovery of actual damages or a
prescribed civil penalty, whichever is greater.
Under § 50-636(a) of the Act, the maximum civil
penalty which may be awarded is $2,000. The
trial court had awarded Abbick the $2,000 maximum civil penalty in lieu of the $1,185 jury
award for actual damages.
Finally, the court reasoned that the statutory
purpose for the civil penalty is to encourage
enforcement of the act by consumers acting as
"private attorney general[s]." 757 P.2d. at 307.
The civil penalty provision is remedial rather
than punitive, and its purpose is to encourage
aggrieved consumers with small claims to file
suit. The court also noted that a comment to the
Act specifically provides that nothing in the statute itself limits other remedies provided by law.
Because the jury had found that Abbick had
relied on a fraudulent promise of future events,
an independent tort existed with elements different from those which constituted a violation
of the Act. For all these reasons, the court held
that the additional punitive damage award was
proper.
Moore's final argument, that attorneys' fees
had been awarded improperly to Abbick, was
also rejected by the court. The fee award and the
punitive damage award were not duplicative as
Moore contended, because the purpose of a fee
award is to compensate while the purpose of a
punitive damage award is to deter and punish.
The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that the
trial court had properly exercised its discretion
in awarding attorneys' fees.
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